Currently, virtual world governance is the product of end user license agreements, contracts which attempt to provide a complete legal and enforcement system to the virtual world. This method of governance is flawed, however, and results in participant frustration. Alternative approaches that have been advanced so far include governmental regulation, which has begun in some countries. However, numerous pressures and precedent resist such an application in the United States. The following argues against keeping just the license agreements as the body of law, and also against a wholesale shift toward governmental regulation.
INTRODUCTION
Virtual worlds are "the next generation of the internet: three-dimensional social environments that combine top-of-theline videogame graphics with latest-generation social-networking technology." 1 They are interactive, persistent simulations of first person physical environments. 2 Millions of people participate in these virtual worlds for diverse reasons: for example, escapism, profiteering, or for a sense of belonging to a community. Developers create virtual worlds and make them immersive and debatably addictive. 3 The developers charge fees for property within virtual worlds, or for access to the virtual world, and use these revenues to recover their development and operating expenditures. They also attempt to regulate these virtual worlds, with varying success. Here, I examine those attempts (with indebtedness to prior works), and then suggest a new method which is a compromise between the current methods of regulation.
Prior works on the regulation of virtual worlds have identified major defects with the two current methods of regulating virtual worlds. The primary is the developer's End User License Agreement (EULA)-a contract between the developer and the participant that communicates the developer's expectations for the virtual world to the participant, and the participant's agreement communicates their intent to be bound by those expectations. 4 1 Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 429 (2008) . 2 Mark Bartholomew, Advertising in the Garden of Eden, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 741-42 (2007) . 3 McKenzie Funk, I was a Chinese Internet Addict, HARPER'S MAGAZINE (March 2007) (article regarding Chinese internet addiction rehab clinics and the prevalence in China: "Also in Shanghai, it was reported that a young man who'd played online games for six years would be stuck forever in a sitting position. His back was fused at a 90-degree angle; doctors said there was nothing they could do." Another participant in Tianjin played World of Warcraft for 36 hours before committing suicide, complete with leaving a note about being "off to meet the game's characters.") 4 EULA is used throughout this Note to refer to contracts similar to EULAs. This EULA usually gives the developer the power to adjudicate and punish participant behavior that is outside of those expectations, and the developer power to set expectations. A realworld analogy is the developer controlling the legislative and judicial branches of government, and running the government as a for-profit enterprise. These EULAs set the laws of the land for the virtual world, trying to incorporate a bare minimum of real-world legal systems to keep participants complacent.
Real-world citizenship is often a matter of where you were born. By contrast, "[p]eople joining virtual worlds have the power of choice. . . . they can choose the society in which they want to live, migrating their online activities from place to place with much greater ease than real-world immigrants can move their physical lives." 5 As a result, " [v] irtual world providers who operate within this market-dynamic measure their success in terms of the size of their user base, and they consequently pursue two goals: attracting people to join their virtual world, and retaining them over time." 6 Because virtual-world citizens can pick their government and regulation, developers must make them appealing.
The other method of regulating virtual worlds has not yet been used in the US, but is waiting in the wings: real-world governmental regulation. Virtual-world developers and participants both regard this method with horror, recalling Napster. Regulation fractured Napster's centralized peer-to-peer community into decentralized peer-to-peer communities, too small to feasibly regulate. 7 Real-world regulators want to avoid this outcome. Questions abound about the method of regulation. Should regulators regulate the virtual-world providers within the regulator's jurisdiction, or to coordinate inter-jurisdictionally? 8 Should regulators limit participants' ability to switch worlds, or limit participants to virtual-world developers within their realworld jurisdiction? 9 No clear answer exists for these, and persuading so many disparate jurisdictions is quite a task.
A compromise suggested is for developers of virtual worlds to form a council that can collaboratively improve developers' separate EULAs. This will provide consistent virtual-world http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID925213_code410303.pdf?ab stractid=807966. 5 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and John Crowley, Napster's Second Life?: The Regulatory Challenges of Virtual Worlds, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1775 REV. , 1802 REV. (2006 . 6 Id. 7 Id. at 1824 ("If real-world regulators push too hard, one potential outcome could be that we may witness 'Napster's Second Life,' the transformation of virtual worlds onto a highly decentralized P2P infrastructure that is hosted on individual users' computers."); Phillip Stoup, Note, The Development and Failure of Social Norms in Second Life, 58 DUKE L.J. 311, 340-41 (2008) ("Similar to the fracturing that occurred after the government heavily regulated internet file-sharing programs like the popular program 'Napster,' real-world regulation could lead to the dissolution of Second Life."). 8 Mayer-Schönberger et al., supra note 5 at 1821. 9 Id. governance that is more palatable to courts. This council can also collectively draft model real-world regulation and set bodies of standards for virtual worlds to guide real-world regulators. Participants being participants, they will test the provisions of any developer's EULA, and consistent real-world regulation "floating" over the top of the EULA is necessary to protect aggrieved participants.
This compromise is efficient because developers are best equipped to find the shortcomings of their EULAs. User feedback, litigation, and research while drafting EULAs, especially while sharing the cost of legal research accomplish this. Developers also wield the power and political muscle to lobby for real-world regulations to control behavior in virtual worlds. It will also lower the high value as precedents of the first "lucky" jurisdiction to have virtual-world-based litigation go to trial.
On its face, organizing this council is a difficult task. However, the credit card companies American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa, Inc. launched a similar effort in 2006. Called the PCI Security Standards Council, the Council's mission has been to develop a consistent "Data Security Standard" which has been implemented into each company's data security compliance program. 10 Retail merchants now know of a set of standards that apply to them if they are to be "PCI-compliant"-just as participants and courts considering a virtual world that is "virtualworld-council-compliant" will know what to expect from it.
This consists of four Parts. Part I introduces virtual worlds and their sources of regulation. Part II examines the reasons why EULAs alone have failed or will fail as the only source of regulation. Part III examines the reasons why external regulation alone will fail regardless of implementation, and how to prolong the life of any proposed regulation. Part IV will show the benefits of consistency that a virtual-world council could provide to a twotier system of regulation, and why it is the most efficient solution.
I. VIRTUAL WORLDS AND THE SOURCES OF VIRTUAL-WORLD REGULATION
Modern virtual worlds' heritage extends back to textual virtual worlds, which are given a variety of names to denote their purpose. 11 A compelling example is LambdaMOO, beginning discussion on virtual world's "parallel alternative to existing legal systems, where new forms of social regulation can be explored." 12 10 PCI Security Standards Council, About the PCI Security Standards Council, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about/index.shtml. 11 For a discussion of the acronyms used and their meanings, see F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 n.84 (2004). Referenced here, " 'MOO' stands for 'MUD Object-Oriented,' denoting the programming methodology-object orientation-which was used to build the MUD." Id. 12 Id. at 11. On LambdaMOO, "public and commons property was [virtual property's] prototypical form of ownership." 13 The virtual world's "[e]xperienced players also build their own rooms and spaces within the MOO, or, using an object-oriented programming language, create objects that they and other players can manipulate or expand." 14 These "[p]articipants in the MOO are literally building their own universe room by room. At the same time, they are building their own social structure, as well as their own legal system." 15 Eventually, real-world-property issues infected LambdaMOO: air-space rights over properties (for virtual aircraft), private versus public property, whether property could be bequeathed, and server-side-data quotas per participant. 16 These required "making property an explicit part of the system and creating an official governance mechanism to recognize and allocate it." Property interests are tied to Western society such that asserting property rights is instinctual. Therefore, virtual worlds have come to require regulation to support participants' view that their virtual-world property is able to be protected just like their real-world property.
Virtual property here is closer to real property than intellectual property. A participant's virtual property has their ownership right recorded somewhere in a database that the virtual world relies on. 17 The participant then has, or expects, the use and control of the property to be one of their rights.
On LambdaMOO and in many textual virtual worlds the communities are close-knit. Developers were known to the participants and were benevolent dictators, styling themselves as "wizards." 18 Three years after its creation, arch-wizard Pavel Curtis decided that his social experiment had grown up: "the wizards are pulling out of the discipline/manners/arbitration business; we're handing the burden and freedom of that role to the society at large." 19 These wizards made themselves the community's code architects-their functions "might be analogized to a cross between an administrative agency and a higher court." Significant issues go to a public vote and volunteers staff a binding arbitration system. The system is not without its flaws. 20 However unlike the virtual worlds that have made the 13 19 Id. 20 See id. (The current system of LambdaLaw is viewed as corrupt and "[t]wo very different approaches have emerged for confronting the limitations of the industry famous, LambdaMOO's system has been shaped by the community, rather than shape the community. The intent of Curtis in getting out of the discipline business was to allow the community to self-govern. 21 This effort ultimately failed; within two years Curtis "restored the rule of the wizard by fiat." 22 Compare LambdaMOO's system of regulation by the community to more recent virtual worlds' systems of developerdesigned regulation of the community. Some virtual worlds support participant creation of rooms and objects within the virtual world, such as Second Life. 23 Other worlds have had developers carefully create and balance their content and allow participants little to no autonomy in content creation, focusing on allowing participants to "acquire" developer-created property. 24 These virtual worlds have "millions of dollars of venture capital at stake," and it is ventured to build cash flows for the developer to reward investors. 25 To developers, community governance is not structured such that investor return is maximized, and is therefore inferior.
The results are "EULAs that attempt to dismantle even the potential of virtual rights." 26 These EULAs provide as few rights as possible, and also set up regulatory systems to enforce developer's expectations for participant behavior. LambdaMOO's alternative might erode the developer's rights in their virtual world, where they "should have a right to do exactly as they please," as goes the argument. 27 Therefore, EULAs present what appears to be an oppressive regulatory scheme. In the next Part, reasons why this scheme may fail are examined. current system: one approach favors increased formalization of LambdaLaw, while the other wants LambdaLaw eliminated." Formalizer's attempted petitions for legal reform have been stymied by Eliminators; Eliminator's attempted petitions to mock "Lambda-politicians" with a humorous bent stymied by Formalizers. Like any democratic system, LambdaMOO has all kinds of citizens with different intents for their experience in participating.). 21 Mayer-Schönberger et al., supra note 5 at 1795. 22 Id. at 1796. 23 
II. EULAS FAIL TO PROVIDE REGULATION TO BOTH THE DEVELOPER AND USER, REQUIRING EXTERNAL REGULATION
EULAs are contracts between virtual world's developers and their customers. 28 They provide what customers can and cannot do with the virtual world, and provide what rights customers have in their avatars and creations in the virtual world and the real world. 29 EULAs are the primary source of virtualworld law and regulation. However, when drafting a EULA, usually only the developer and the developer's counsel are at the table. 30 As a result, the developer arrogates all rights it could possibly want to it, often including the rights to any participant creations within the developer's virtual world. 31 Participants then encounter the EULA on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, 32 often with the desire to participate in the virtual world predicated on acceptance of the EULA.
The EULA tries to define participants' behavior, which often includes forbidding communicating other user's personal information. 33 Developers have an interest in implementing provisions of the EULA as programmatic constraints on the participants where possible. 34 This lowers the developers' use of resources to police the EULA.
EULAs' regulatory framework is fraught with problems: First, the developers' superior bargaining strength results in a stilted EULA that is susceptible to the unconscionability doctrine. Second, participants aggrieved by other participants within the virtual world often only have recourse under the EULA at the 28 See Fairfield, supra note 4 at 1082-84. 29 Id. 30 But see Facebook's invitation of its users to contribute to their EULA, via "virtual Town Halls," 30 day public comment periods, and statements of changes. Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Opens Governance of Service and Policy Process to Users (February 26, 2009), available at http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=85587. 31 See Fairfield, supra note 1 at 453 ("Thus, one could imagine that virtual-world creators might resist arguments that the EULA creates any property interest at all in its licensees."). 32 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606 (D. Pa. 2007) ("Although Bragg is an experienced attorney, . . . he was never presented with an opportunity to use his experience and lawyering skills to negotiate terms different from the [EULA] that Linden offered."). 33 See World of Warcraft Terms of Use § 9 (B)(v), available at http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html; Second Life | Terms of Service, available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php ("In addition to abiding at all times by the Community Standards, you agree that you shall not: . . . (v) take any actions or upload, post, e-mail or otherwise transmit Content that contains . . . personal information[.]"). 34 See Stoup, supra note 7 at 320 ("Code-based norms can be created and employed by [developers] to fulfill the virtual world's important objectives, but unlike non-code-based norms, these rules are enforced through the very computer code of [the virtual world]." Using the code-based alternative "defin[es] what conduct or behaviors are possible in the computer program's virtual world," for example, making a theft-proof purse to store items.) developers' discretion, either due to explicit EULA terms or because of relying on the developer to provide personal information of the other participant. Third, the developers' intent is to keep subscribers happy, paying, and enlisting their friends as subscribers, not act as their virtual world's judiciary. 35 Fourth, participants who are determined to exploit the programmed rules of the virtual world, whether for personal gain or pleasure, do so without meaningful repercussions. 36 This Part covers these four problems in-depth.
A.
EULAS AND THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE Modern findings of unconscionability arise under Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, stating that courts "may refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or clause, or may limit an unconscionable clause to avoid an unconscionable result." 37 Because the Code does not define unconscionability, 38 courts have generally required that both procedural and substantive unconscionability exist. The traditional wisdom is that courts fail to find unconscionability. 39 However, arbitration provisions, which are often employed in EULAs, have proven susceptible to holdings of unconscionability. 40 Many of these holdings were in California or applying California law. 41 To a court, holding EULA provisions should be a controversial decision. Many commentators believe that unconscionability should be reserved for gross injustice and beyond-the-pale behavior. For example, consider a retail store who sells furniture over a number of years via installment lines of credit to a single parent raising a large family on public welfare. If 35 See Ben Quarmby, Pirates Among the Second Life Islands-Why You Should Monitor the Misuse of Your Intellectual Property in Online Virtual Worlds, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 690 (2009) ("Linden Lab is aware that its approach may fail to satisfy many owners of intellectual property, but responds that it does 'not intend to become the law enforcement of Second Life;' " Quarmby's analysis also states that "[a]s a commercial entity . . . Linden Lab is understandably reluctant to take on the mantle of a police state. It simply reserves the right to terminate the accounts of individuals who appear to be infringing on others' intellectual property -a step that it will not take lightly."). 36 Stoup, supra note 7 at 339 ("there will likely always be individuals who have the inclination to ignore the clear rules and the knowledge necessary to tear down Linden [Research]'s code laws. When the fencing of Linden's automated code fails, the regulations of real-world authority will be needed to effectively govern Second Life.") 37 Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 190 (2004) . 38 Id. 39 Id. at 194. 40 Id.
("A systematic examination shows that in 2002-2003, litigants raised issues of unconscionability in 235 cases, and courts found contracts or clauses to be unconscionable in 100 of those cases, . . . Of those 235 cases, 161, or 68.5%, involved arbitration agreements." Of arbitration agreements, "50.3% [were] . . . unconscionable, as opposed to 25.6% of other types of contracts.") 41 Id. at 194-95, see infra note 55 for the importance of California caselaw in arbitration provisions of EULAs. the store buried a provision in fine print that keeps a balance due on all items until each and every item is paid off in full, such that when the customer defaults the store can sue for every piece of furniture "sold," that provision should be held unconscionable. 42 Courts that apply this to participants who either didn't read the EULA, or enjoyed the service provided by the EULA then breached its terms, may be viewed as activist. Notwithstanding this risk, federal courts have found unconscionability in EULAs. 43 The first part of the test, procedural unconscionability, looks at the agreement for unequal bargaining power. EULAs usually meet this part. 44 Participants have zero bargaining power in EULAs; they are designed to be contracts for millions of participants to accept, typically without reading. 45 Contracts of adhesion tend to indicate procedural unconscionability. 46 Generally, they come on pre-printed forms for mass-market environments, giving the consumer no ability to negotiate. 47 They also use general terms and reflect the developer's interests. 48 The participant's surprise as to the harshness of provisions is also an element of procedural unconscionability within California. 49 The second part, substantive unconscionability, looks to the terms of the agreement, and is indicated by "harsh, one-sided or oppressive terms. . . ." 50 EULAs usually meet this part as well. Most of them give the developer "unilateral, unchecked, godlike power, while the customer has few or no rights." 51 Even virtual worlds that purport to protect participants' intellectual property rights 52 retain complete control over their currency, "analogous to 42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. e, illus. 5 (1981). 43 Randall, supra note 37 at 194. 44 a casino arbitrarily eliminating the market for its chips and keeping all of its customer's money." 53 Furthermore, EULAs typically allow developers to change the agreement at any time without notice to the user, in addition to their "godlike power" already reserved. 54 Federal courts have held these agreements unconscionable. 55 In Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania struck down Second Life's provision requiring arbitration. 56 Bragg purchased a number of parcels of land through Second Life, paying real money for the property right. 57 Linden deemed that one of these for which Bragg paid $300 off of an auction site was purchased via an "exploit." 58 Based on that, Linden "froze Bragg's account, effectively confiscating all of the virtual property and currency[.]" Bragg sued Linden in Pennsylvania, who moved for dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Linden's national campaign to induce investment met minimum contacts for specific personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. 59 After settling that, the court moved to Linden's motion to compel arbitration, based on a provision in the EULA. 60 They held that the provision intended to take the participant by surprise, "buried . . . in a lengthy paragraph under the benign heading 'GENERAL PROVISIONS.' " 61 Because of the EULA also met the requirements of a contract of adhesion, this was held to meet procedural unconscionability. 62 Substantive unconscionability was met by a number of the EULA's elements. 63 These included lack of mutuality in forcing the participant to arbitrate while the developer has a choice of forums, and the excessive cost incurred by the participant in arbitrating versus the cost in filing in court. 64 Also considered were the venue restriction for arbitration in light of the small size 53 Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 17. 54 of financial transactions most participants have with Second Life, and the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings, which results in "a one-sided means which tilts unfairly, in almost all situations, in Linden's favor." 65 Courts are willing to erode the terms of EULAs, creating a chilling effect for both developers and participants, each uncertain of the terms of their agreement. 66 For example, Second Life's EULA allows Linden Research to completely control Second Life's currency up to and including removing it all. Any measures taken by Linden Research to use that EULA provision, however, will send Second Life participants to federal courts in droves to recover their real money losses. 67 The system to exchange real money for Second Life currency and vice versa operated by Linden Research 68 underscores the substantive unconscionability of allowing Linden Research to use this provision. If EULAs are not modified by developers to withstand these challenges, developers will have them modified by courts inspired by Bragg to protect participants.
B. PARTICIPANTS' RECOURSE UNDER EULAS
In the real world, if your neighbor cutting down a tree in their yard with a chainsaw at 3 a.m. annoys you, your first means of recourse is through the police to stop them from cutting down trees at ungodly hours, and civil courts for nuisance. In virtual worlds, if their neighbor erecting garish signs with political messages adjacent to their property aggrieves a participant 69 their first means of recourse is through the EULA.
Usually, this means "opening up a ticket" or filing an abuse report that is queued for service from an employee of the developer. 70 The employee interprets the EULA, exercising the developer's rights in a way deemed appropriate. For example, the 65 Id. 66 Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 32 ("A chilling effect occurs when behavior might run afoul of the EULA, but the agreement may potentially be unenforceable, so parties err on the side of too much caution in order to avoid the potential risk that exists in the grey areas of the agreement."). 67 Id. at ¶ 33. 68 This currency exchange is called the LindeX, described in detail at id. at ¶ 2 n.4; Second Life | Terms of Service, § 1.5, available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php. 69 Stoup, supra note 7 at 331 ("For example, a Second Life resident named Lazarus Devine angered many other users by erecting garish virtual signs calling for an end to the war in Iraq and to "Impeach Bush" on property he purchased adjacent to the disgruntled users. . . . Despite the best efforts of the disgruntled users, Lazarus Devine continued his campaign to erect garish signs.") (internal citations omitted). 70 McCarthy, supra note 52, contains an example of this process: "I filed an abuse report immediately, a procedure you follow in [Second Life] when there is an issue with another resident." The report "automatically notes the precise location of your avatar when the report is filed, and it included a snapshot of the scene I saw there, with the infringing[] sign. I received e-mail confirmation of the abuse report." employee may warn or suspend the account of a participant who is harassing another participant. Or they may remove materials that should not exist in the virtual world. 71 All of these occur at the employee's, and therefore the developer's, discretion. A realworld analogy would be the employee representing the police, judge, jury, and jailor.
The maximum punishment meted out in many virtual worlds is account termination. 72 Developers typically do not report any activity within their virtual world to authorities even if it is likely in violation of civil or penal laws, unless subpoenaed. 73 Regardless of circumstances, developers often do not facilitate participants' attempts to sue other participants by providing IP addresses 74 or personal information of the other participant. Even if a participant would be entitled under real-world law to a greater remedy than the EULA and developer allow, the EULA and the developer's privacy policy usually protect personal information from disclosure. 75 This generally makes participants' attempts to pursue remedies outside of the developer's EULA futile. To do so, the participant would have to know their prospective defendant's name and address. 76 Under many privacy policies, the participant would also have to convince the developer to release this personal information. 77 The developer may also not be able to provide meaningful information about a participant for outside remedies. 71 Id. 72 See Stoup, supra note 7 at 331 ("Even Second Life's harshest sanction, the threat of account termination, which is prescribed as a possible punishment in the virtual world's Term [sic] of Service, is also likely an ineffective sanction."); see also Quarmby, supra note 35 at 690. 73 See Leonard T. Nuara et al., No Man is an Island, not even in a Virtual World, 943 PLI/Pat 523, 557 n.159 (2008) ("In compliance with a subpoena . . . Linden Lab and PayPal provided Catteneo's IP address to Alderman."). Commentators advocate that certain activities, in particular illicit and pornographic ones, should receive real-world reporting to authorities from developers. See Stoup, supra note 7 at 337. 74 An IP address is a unique identifier for a computer that is accessible through the internet. 75 E.g. Linden Lab, Second Life | Terms of Service, available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php. ("Linden Lab will not give any of your personal information to any third party without your express approval except: . . . to law enforcement or other appropriate third parties in connection with criminal investigations and other investigations of fraud[.]"), see also Linden Lab, Second Life | Privacy Policy, available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/privacy.php. ("Linden Lab may disclose your personal information if required to do so by law or in the good faith belief that such action is necessary to: . . . (b) protect and defend the rights or property of . . . the users of Second Life[.]") (emphases added) 76 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (a)(1)(B) (requiring summons to be "directed to the defendant") and FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (e)(2)(B) (leaving summons at "dwelling or usual place of abode"). 77 Linden Lab, supra note 75.
For example, Second Life now requires only an email address to register. 78 Participants often rightly blame the EULA and the developer's policies for being unable to fight for a remedy. It drives some participants to extremes. For example, an acquaintance of Qiu Chengwei's stole and sold Chengwei's rare sword from a Chinese virtual world. 79 Chengwei went to the police, who believed the acquaintance broke no laws because the sword was virtual property and therefore not protectable. 80 Therefore, he took matters into his own hands a month later-he stabbed the acquaintance to death. 81 At trial he confessed and received life imprisonment. 82 For every participant who lashes out like Chengwei due to their lack of a sufficient remedy, countless more simply become dissatisfied with the virtual world and its developers. These participants stop paying and leave the virtual world. 83 What ties them to the world are all of their virtual possessions, which are generally not transferable and not able to be sold, and their reputation within the virtual world. 84 This creates lock-in and network effects. 85 Because of this, and the bad press from occurrences like Changwei's, the ineffective remedies provided to participants in EULAs should be of concern to developers.
The United States lags behind other countries in this lack of real-world recourse for virtual-world participants. In South Korea 78 Quarmby, supra note 35 at 692. ("Formerly, Linden Lab required prospective users to provide a valid credit card or Paypal account, or to respond to a cell phone SMS text message, in order to open an account. After June 6, 2006, however, its users may create an account with only an e-mail address." Quarmby goes on to indicate Linden's other sources of user information: "[Linden] should, however, still be in a position to provide that user's IP address. But even that is not always guaranteed. [Software programs] allow users' computers to generate a new IP address every time they go online, thus thwarting attempts to easily track down an infringer by IP address alone.") (internal citations omitted). 79 no means to appeal a Linden Lab decision within the TOS, a dissatisfied user who wants to dispute only has one method to voice their discontent: leaving the game platform."). 84 See infra Part II.C (discussing real money trading). 85 See Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 6; Mayer-Schönberger et al., supra note 5 at 1793 ("[P]articipants in virtual worlds incur significant social and financial costs when they are forced to leave. They not only have to leave behind a network of friends and their accumulation of social and other capital, but also are forced to abandon the persistent narrative that they have constructed . . . .").
virtual worlds have much greater traction due to the success of NCsoft's Lineage, released in 1998. 86 South Korea statutorily protects virtual property, which "cannot be bought or sold commercially, but it can be exchanged between non-merchant individuals for in-world trade or currency. Theft of virtual property is a criminal offense." 87 Additionally, Dutch and Japanese courts have convicted for theft of virtual property. 88 Several other foreign jurisdictions have begun to map real-world rights and regulation into virtual worlds, 89 and as a result become more or less attractive to business investment. 90
C.
DEVELOPER'S INTENT WITH EULAS Developers countervail their self-imposed duties 91 to punish and correct with their employer's desire to retain paying participants. 92 They aren't creating virtual worlds for the sake of creating virtual worlds and social experimentation, as LambdaMOO did. 93 Instead they have returns to maximize for investors and shareholders. 94 Because of this, there is an interest in creating as oppressive a regulatory regime as possible. Doing so lowers administrative and litigation expenses, 95 so long as it doesn't scare away potential subscribers or drive out existing ones en masse. 96 Because of this, a virtual-world equivalent to realworld incarceration's long-term separation of the convicted from society does not exist because the convict would quickly leave the virtual world. 97 86 Per Prof. Fairfield, "The South Korean population is 48 million. As of February 1, 2004, 30 million users had accessed the Lineage virtual environments. Over two million users access Lineage regularly. Over forty-one percent of South Korean teenagers spend significant amounts of time in virtual worlds." Fairfield, supra note 4 at 1087-88 (internal citations omitted). 87 P]roviders want to take little or no responsibility for interactions between their users so long as users do not leave in droves."). 97 Contra Stoup, supra note 7 at 330 ("The cornfield purgatory sanction entailed banishing a resident who violated one of the rules of Second Life to [an area] where all the resident could do was ride a tractor in a field of corn." To their chagrin, "[t]his sanction was ultimately an ineffective deterrent because many
The intent of developers is usually retaining "the ability to modify the world as they see fit, without being limited contractually." 98 However even if their true intent, commentators dispute whether the EULAs that are drafted achieve this goal. 99 Instead, these EULAs create chilling effects from uncertain rights and potential for lawsuits-all of which would be lowered by "drafting the terms fairly-or at least less lopsidedly[.]" 100 Developer's drafting of EULAs has also been intended to preclude any property right in virtual property acquired or created by participants. Because the EULA is up front, developers may allege, participants are on notice. They should not become too attached to their characters and possessions because ultimate control rests with the developer. This argument disregards theories through which participants should (and absent a possibly unconscionable contract provision, would) have a property interest in their virtual property. 101 It also undermines the premise of virtual worlds-developers make these worlds to inspire participants to invest time and energy in their character, with the expectation that the developer won't capriciously seize their property.
Another intent expressed by developers is to prevent real money trade, "the sale of in-game items, currency, characters or other data in order to obtain real money." 102 Certain developers have embraced this activity, others have forbidden it. 103 Many of the developers who embrace it do so because the revenue from selling virtual property is becoming substantial; Second Life and Everquest II have real money trade operations owned and sanctioned by the developer, possibly to derive commissions and yet another income source. 104 Market interest in real money trade is forecasted to increase. 105 residents wanted to see the cornfield purgatory and started to purposefully violate Second Life's rules to experience the tractor ride.") 98 Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 19. 99 Id. (among the reasons: the EULAs are already so in the favor of the developer, it's hard to see how they are limited; also the lack of notice militates against enforceability.) 100 104 Fritzsche, supra note 45 at Part III. 105 Id.
If the participants' virtual property rights are recognized, however, developers that forbid real money trade may find courts willing to hold that forbiddance unconscionable. But for the EULA provision forbidding real money trade, 106 World of Warcraft's over 11.5 million subscribers 107 would be able to trade and sell their virtual property interests in their character and inventory. It shocks the conscience to see a contract of adhesion put this severe a restraint on such a valuable property interest. 108
D. SPY VS. SPY 109 ONLINE-VIRTUAL-WORLD PARTICIPANTS' ATTEMPTS TO OUTWIT DEVELOPERS' EULA AND PROGRAMMATIC CONSTRAINTS
In games where the EULA forbids real money trading, the black or grey market still engages in real money trading. 110 Businesses operate around the lucrative premise of generating virtual property to offer for real money trade. The market was worth approximately one billion dollars in 2007. This has several negative effects on participant's experience: the inability to prevent this black market arouses participant's resentment of the black market's EULA violations, 111 and the risk of fraud rises. 112 Entire participant accounts are also traded and sold, again generally in violation of EULAs. This is done to be able to have characters who can participate in groups with other friends who have invested significant amounts of time into their characters and also to impress others with all of their seemingly hard-earned 106 World of Warcraft Terms of Use § 11, available at http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (agreeing to "no right or title in or to . . . virtual goods or currency appearing or originating in the Game[.] . . . Blizzard does not recognize . . . the purported sale, gift or trade in the "real world" of anything that appears or originates in the Game."). 107 Press Release, Blizzard Entertainment, World of Warcraft Subscriber Base Reaches 11.5 Million Worldwide (December 23, 2008), available at http://www.blizzard.com/us/press/081121.html. 108 See Fritzsche, supra note 45 at Part III; contra Jamie J. Kayser virtual possessions. 113 Developers police listings on popular auction sites such as eBay and successfully prevent some sellers. 114 The same black market issues risen above apply to these transactions.
Lowering these negative effects is one reason for developer-sanctioned-and-operated real money trade operations, as discussed in II.C. Doing so allows developer control over the market-they can "ensure performance on all contracts, thus eliminating fraud and thereby generating heightened customer satisfaction." 115 Real money trading regulation as opposed to prohibition is an increasing trend in virtual world governance-EverQuest II's allowance was a reversal for a major virtual world developer in this area.
Aside from virtual property restraints, virtual-world law also involves other areas of real-world law. Consider torts: having millions of people interacting in these virtual worlds will necessarily create some virtual libels, batteries, and intentional inflictions of emotional distress. The feeling of anonymity granted by the internet, enhanced by a participant's character being a literal "troll," 116 leads to behavioral extremes in virtual worlds. During a news interview within the virtual world, animated phalluses attacked a real-estate mogul in Second Life with real-world portraits of the mogul's player holding a giant phallus. 117 Virtual world developers as a social experiment created a trader in A Tale in the Desert who "caused an uproar when he 'declared he would not sell to women and then inquired whether one female character was for sale.' " 118 These, too, are often forbidden by EULAs. 119 But such provisions are impossible to enforce adequately, and usually sanctions for such activity are not severe. Participants who engage in such activity create false pretenses for having done so when asked by the developer's employees, under II.B's abuse reportsthey claim to be role-playing or provocation. Generally, the true purpose is for the lulz, "the joy of disrupting another's emotional equilibrium. 'Lulz is watching someone lose their mind at their computer 2,000 miles away while you chat with friends and laugh,' said one ex-troll . . . ." 120 To summarize, EULAs taken alone present a flawed method of governance of virtual worlds. First, they are rooted in contracts that are susceptible to unconscionability and, increasingly, courts are finding it. Second, participants are not the intended beneficiaries of this source of virtual world law indicated by their lack of recourse under the EULA, which undermines their participatory experience. Third, the developers' intent is not to provide a judicial system, only to keep subscribers complacent and paying. Finally, participants have motivation and capability to circumvent EULA provisions. Because of these failings, external regulation is necessary as a second tier of rulemaking.
III. CURRENT EXTERNAL REGULATORY ATTEMPTS FAIL TO PROPERLY REGULATE, REQUIRING EULAS
Even at its best. external regulation will not protect every instance of behaviors not protected by EULAs in virtual worlds. There are problems, including jurisdiction of participants of virtual worlds, which are common to the internet itself. 121 Traditional notions of jurisdiction greatly increase the difficulty of litigants bringing real-world actions based on virtual-world acts; many of their potential defendants are in distant or extra-national jurisdictions. 122 Federal statutes to regulate this would provide intra-national consistency, but would be helpless in cases from outside the nation.
Because of this, Professor Fairfield argues for a commonlaw-codified-to-statute approach for the internet: "Rules for regulation of the Internet have developed according to the same process as the common law elsewhere: business norms have developed into industry standards, which in turn are adopted by courts, and the resulting common law rules are codified by statutes." 123 The solution proposed in this work in Part IV formalizes the business norms and industry standards portion of this method for the virtual world industry, giving courts ready 120 Schwartz, supra note 116. 121 See Assalone, supra note 83 at 188-89 (jurisdictional issues with tax regulation of virtual worlds); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Cracks in the Foundation: The New Internet Legislation's Hidden Threat to Privacy and Commerce, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1193, 1200 (2006) ("[T]he possibility of nearly infinite access to people in other jurisdictions, combined with the ease and low expense of such contacts, has operated to raise the frequency of cross-border transactions to an unprecedented degree."). 122 Id. at 1219-20 (discussing federal CAN-SPAM Act's limitations against outof-country spammers). 123 Id. at 1199. access to standards to consider; this Part considers alternative routes to regulation.
A.
"THE BLIND ARE NOT GOOD TRAILBLAZERS" 124 Because of the differences between EULAs, courts and legislators will have great difficulty deciding virtual world issues without any guidance. Essentially, each virtual world has its own legal system, coined as EULAw by one commentator. 125 "Federal legislation in the new arena of virtual worlds also runs the risk of outstripping congressional understanding of the issues and technology of virtual worlds, as it has in other areas of technology." 126 Some virtual worlds even have a notion of caselaw. 127 These complicate any one-size-fits-all solution devised by regulators. Judge Easterbrook indicates, "If we are so far behind in matching law to a well-understood technology such as photocopiers . . . what chance do we have for a technology such as computers that is mutating faster than the virus in The Andromeda Strain?" 128 Mapping current regulatory methods into virtual worlds also has significant problems, albeit different from EULAs. Unlike real property, virtual property is susceptible to bugs in the virtual world that can reduce its utility and value. 129 The development process also leads to newly created virtual properties unbalancing the existing virtual world, and subsequent rebalancing efforts to correct that. The developer also retains an interest-a possessory interest at the code level-of virtual property. 130 Other regulatory schemes have had similar difficulties when applied to virtual worlds. 131 Commentators question whether or not external regulation is required at all. Because current property doctrines do not fit virtual worlds, Mr. Dan E. Lawrence argues that it would require "new property law doctrines to protect virtual property." 132 Even if needed, there's only a "narrow range of circumstances entitling a 124 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996) . 125 Jankowich, supra note 55 at 8. 126 Rogers, supra note 79 at 414 (quoting Jankowich, supra note 55 at 5). 127 virtual property holder to a legal remedy." Lawrence determines that current contractual arrangements and the ability of courts to declare certain provisions unconscionable are sufficient for virtual property, and that the attention afforded virtual worlds "does not per se demonstrate the need for new laws." If existing laws work, use them. 133 This argument is flawed for virtual worlds when applied to regulatory applications outside of property, including propertybased torts and torts against the person. These differ from Mr. Lawrence's example of real-world tortious acts that are allowed and accepted within the virtual world, such as the ability for your character to steal property in Ultima Online 134 ; these are acts arising from or related to conduct in the virtual world that is a realworld tort directed at the participant, not their character in the virtual world. These are generally forbidden by EULAs, 135 but are not enforced in the same manner as a court would. Examples above show that the developer's business model incentivizes the developer to lack interest in providing the same remedies that a court could provide to participant-to-participant interactions. 136 These failures to provide remedies have contributed to real-world murder and other crimes from frustrated participants. Chengwei's sword was not protected under China's property laws at the time, resulting in grave consequences. 137 Applying real-world regulation and modifying it as needed to specifically address torts arising from virtual worlds is justified here.
The argument also fails to protect virtual property transactions that are outside the terms of the EULA, which is an agreement between just a participant and the developer, not between participants. Participants who would have a colorable legal claim against another participant need to apply the third-party beneficiary doctrine for which "[t]o date, . . . the practical and theoretical boundaries of . . . application to virtual worlds have yet to be fully explored, perhaps because of an overly narrow doctrinal conception." 138 Even if found to apply, "[t]he question becomes which terms are actionable by one member against another and which terms are not." 139 It is likely that this doctrine will change as a result of virtual worlds-another indicator that contract law alone is not sufficient. Existing property law did not anticipate 133 these kinds of contractual wrinkles coming into play. Therefore, regulation must change or new regulation be introduced to support virtual world participation, involving more than just virtual property.
B.
REGULATION WILL LIKELY SPLIT THE VIRTUAL WORLD'S COMMUNITY, FRUSTRATING REGULATORY ATTEMPTS Prior regulatory attempts at internet applications have worked like a cudgel, splitting the community they were intended to regulate into several splinters. Consider the attempted regulation of Napster, which pushed centralized file sharing to decentralized file sharing. 140 The ability of users to emulate servers of virtual worlds and avoid the centralized server provided by the developer indicates the same future is possible here. It would result in virtual world "providers themselves disappear[ing], and with them almost any hope on the part of real-world lawmakers to directly influence the governance inside virtual worlds." 141 Currently, developers have been active in policing the attempts of others to emulate the developer's virtual world server; such behavior is generally against their EULAs. 142 As an additional result, the current regulatory scheme under EULAs would be completely lost. Having no developer control over the world creates a vacuum of enforcement, and players in these decentralized virtual worlds would have no recourse. As with LambdaMOO, "When the [developers] abdicated authority over social conflicts, one character named Mr. Bungle took advantage of the vacuum of rule enforcement to pursue actions online for which he knew he would face no real-world consequences: he engaged in the verbal sexual assault of other avatars." 143 Regulatory efforts may in fact therefore make the current oppressive EULA regime break and anarchy ensue. If developers are "benevolent dictators," these efforts could be analogous to toppling that dictatorship and failing to rebuild a government.
IV. A COORDINATED EFFORT TO PROVIDE REGULATORY GUIDANCE ACROSS VIRTUAL WORLDS MAY PROVIDE A BASIS FOR EXTERNAL REGULATION, OR MAKE EXTERNAL REGULATION UNNECESSARY
Self-regulation of other internet protocols and applications exist already. The World Wide Web Consortium is an international standards organization founded in 1994. Tim Berners-Lee founded it "[t]o lead the World Wide Web to its full potential by developing protocols and guidelines that ensure longterm growth for the Web." 144 The Consortium has been responsible for standardizing graphical formats, Cascading Style Sheets, Hypertext Markup Language revisions, and Extensible Markup Language. 145 Although these have not been adopted and enforced by regulators, those that would be regulated-web browser application developers, web developers, and othersemploy the Consortium's standards. Therefore, it is effective at self-regulation. Other mechanisms for self-regulation come from the Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. 146 The former develops "standards that allow the Internet to function as a global network[;]" the latter administers the domain name system. 147 Mr. Caral summarizes arguments for self-regulation. When adapted to this topic: first, self-regulating developers know their industry and technical limitations; second, developer's accessible expertise lowers the costs of regulation; third, the virtual world developers being regulated know the developers who are regulating them and trust them more than outside regulators; fourth, developer self-regulation may be less formal and save costs; and fifth, the costs are allocated to the virtual world industry not the public. 148 Furthermore, self-regulation is encouraged by the government: "Even where collective action is necessary, governments should encourage industry self-regulation and private-sector leadership where possible . . ." 149 The likely reason that the government is so willing to promote self-regulation for the internet is because the government is only just getting acquainted with how to regulate it. Industry can be the government's role model. 150 However, if industry's self-regulation is effective, the government is willing to stay out: "Where government intervention is necessary, its role should be to ensure competition, . . . and facilitate dispute resolution, not to regulate." 151 Here, the virtual world market is such that self-regulation is feasible. Developers of virtual worlds are few, because of large barriers to entry. 152 Many projects in development never come to fruition due to these barriers. "The market of virtual world providers operates with the conscious parallelism of an oligopoly, instead of a truly competitive market. As a result, consumers often do not have meaningful choice when selecting between EULAs of virtual realms." 153 Developers should self-regulate because keeping governmental regulatory schemes out of their industry or constrained to the standards that collaborating developers set through a virtual world council retains their ability to change the world as they fit. 154 Instead of mere contractual obligations in EULAs, developers would also have to contend with regulatory obligations from external entities. If developers of virtual worlds can prove capable to protect participants' rights and ensure competition between worlds, 155 such regulatory oversight may not be necessary.
Proper protection of participants' rights will require developers to invite participants to the bargaining table for their EULAs. Although this has not been done in virtual worlds, social networking sites on the internet such as Facebook have done so. 156 Persuading individual developers to collaborate with their users proves difficult. Developers hang their hat on the notion that it their virtual world is just a game and that it is just our game; if participants don't like that, they can leave. And right now, the market is sufficiently small and oligopolistic that this developer attitude works because participants lack a meaningful choice. As virtual worlds expand, however-and Professor Edward Castronova predicts 100 million participants by 2030 157 -the industry will need to change. 151 Id. at 8 (emphases added). 152 Kunze, supra note 44 at ¶ 6; Lastowka et al., supra note 11 at 59 n.314 ("The well-known virtual-world design guru Gordon Walton recently made a top ten list of reasons not to create a virtual world . . . Walton's first reason was that today's virtual worlds can cost over $100 million to build." (internal citations omitted)); compare Rogers, supra note 79 at 420 ("As long as potential virtualworld inhabitants act rationally and the barriers to entry for developers of virtual worlds remain relatively low, EULAw (as Jankowich calls it), should be no more problematic than real law,]" citing EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF ONLINE GAMES 65-67 (2005) for the proposition that barriers to entry are low). 153 A standards setting body of developers such as a virtual world council could provide an impetus for change. This would pressure existing virtual world developers to become compliant or lose participant trust. 158 Furthermore, a standard does not stifle competition. Instead, granting incentives that indicate to participants, for example, that this virtual world is compliant with the virtual world council's virtual property standards that protect your investment of time and energy promotes competition. It incentivizes developers that modify their EULA to support these rights and become compliant. Compliance with the virtual world council's possible virtual harassment standards also supports competition, by making participants feel that this virtual world is a safer place to develop their character than a different, noncompliant world.
CONCLUSION
The creation of standards-setting bodies that consist of developers of virtual worlds may provide a solution that avoids external regulation. If the alternative to providing virtual rights to participants is the government wading into the fray, developers may be pressured to protect their participants. When the government enters this arena, Napster-like results can occur to the industry, which would destroy the oligopoly that developers have created.
Additionally, once standards exist, participants and courts have an easier way to view the virtual world than through the byzantine provisions of the EULA. Standards provide a basis for objective comparison of potential virtual worlds to participate in, and a basis for the development of common law methods of adjudicating virtual world disputes. 159 The transaction costs to both participants and courts in interpreting virtual worlds are reduced from standardization.
Finally, developers are the most efficient party to task with the creation of such a council and the creation of standards. They have far and away the most knowledge of how this industry works. They also have the leverage and credibility to persuade developers to compete with each other and attain compliance with the published standards. Lastly, the developers themselves are profiting from the virtual worlds; as for the standards for virtual worlds, they should be creating them and being bound by them.
